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Abstract 
Scarcities of environmental services are no longer merely a remote hypothesis. Consequently, 
analysis of their inequalities between nations becomes of paramount importance for the 
achievement of sustainability in terms either of international policy, or of Universalist ethical 
principles of equity. This paper aims, on the one hand, at revising methodological aspects of the 
inequality measurement of certain environmental data and, on the other, at extending the scarce 
empirical evidence relating to the international distribution of Ecological Footprint (EF), by 
using a longer EF time series. Most of the techniques currently important in the literature are 
revised and then tested on EF data with interesting results. We look in depth at Lorenz 
dominance analyses and consider the underlying properties of different inequality indices. 
Those indices which fit best with environmental inequality measurements are CV
2
 and GE(2) 
because of their neutrality property, however a trade-off may occur when subgroup 
decompositions are performed. A weighting factor decomposition method is proposed in order 
to isolate weighting factor changes in inequality growth rates. Finally, the only non-ambiguous 
way of decomposing inequality by source is the natural decomposition of CV
2
, which 
additionally allows the interpretation of marginal term contributions. Empirically, this paper 
contributes to the environmental inequality measurement of EF: this inequality has been quite 
stable and its change over time is due to per capita vector changes rather than population 
changes. Almost the entirety of the EF inequality is explainable by differences in the means 
between the countries of the World Bank group. This finding suggests that international 
environmental agreements should be attempted on a regional basis in an attempt to achieve 
greater consensus between the parties involved. Additionally, source decomposition warns of 
the dangers of confining CO2 emissions reduction to crop-based energies because of the 
implications for basic needs satisfaction. 
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1. Introduction 
Ecological distribution refers to the social, spatial and temporal asymmetries or inequalities in 
the human use of environmental resources and services (whether trades or not). A typical 
example is the depletion of natural resources (Martinez-Alier and O'Connor, 1999). This paper 
deals with the empirical measurement of ecological distribution. 
The aggravation of ecological crisis
1
 brings distributional issues to the top of the agenda (Luks 
and Stewen, 1999). Since the scarcity of natural resources is now tangible, business-as-usual 
scenarios are feasible neither in a physical, nor in a social, sense. Standard economics has 
attempted to solve current distributional conflicts via growth, thus focussing on efficient 
allocation issues. Nevertheless, since ecological economics puts the scale goal on the table 
(Daly, 1992), fair ecological distribution becomes, not only a necessary condition, but also an 
ethical issue, for the achievement of sustainability. The core concern of sustainable development 
is that of working toward guaranteeing the rights and interests of future generations. However, 
such an approach cannot ignore the deprived people of today while trying to prevent deprivation 
in the future - this would be outrageous (Anand and Sen, 2000). Consequently, ceasing policies 
of unending growth to achieve sustainability will solve the distributional problem of future 
generations only at the expense of worsening the distributional problem within current 
generations (Aubauer, 2006; Daly and Farley, 2004). 
Since allocation of resources is determined neither by ethical nor by ecological criteria, but by 
the dominance of market mechanisms (Røpke, 2001), distributional analysis of responsibilities 
for the depletion of ecological functions comes to the fore as an important tool for policy 
makers. Such responsibilities may not be equally distributed among countries, hence, neither are 
the commitments. The success of any international agreement depends highly on the perception 
of equitability by the parties (Duro and Padilla, 2006; Heil and Wodon, 2000; Padilla and 
Serrano, 2006). Greater responsibilities should involve greater efforts toward global 
sustainability. From Rio 1992 to Durban 2011, passing through Kyoto 1995, distributional 
issues have unquestionably determined the international agreements reached. Consequently, an 
in-depth understanding of ecological inequalities may be critical in achieving greater consensus.  
As a result, papers focussed on the distribution analysis of ecological variables are becoming of 
greater interest in ecological economics: it is noticeable that empirical applications have risen 
significantly in recent years
2
 (Alcantara and Duro, 2004; Aldy, 2006; Criado and Grether, 2010; 
Dongjing et al. 2010; Duro and Padilla, 2006; Duro and Padilla, 2008; Duro et al., 2010; Duro 
                                                 
1
 Collapse of the three highly correlated ecological functions: resource supply, waste assimilation and 
environmental services, such as life support. 
2
 Convergence or inequality approach; both approaches focus on disparities in environmental outcomes 
among countries.   
and Padilla, 2011; Cantore, 2011; Ezcurra, 2007; Heil and Wodon, 1997; Heil and Wodon, 
2000; List, 1999; Heil and Wodon, 1997; Miketa and Mulder, 2005; Nguyen Van, 2005; Padilla 
and Serrano, 2006; Steinberger et al., 2010; Strazicich and List, 2003; White, 2007; Wu and Xu, 
2010). Additionally, as consequence of this literature proliferation, a burgeoning methodology 
discussion is growing around the adaptation of well-known income inequality tools to 
environmental issues (Maguire and Sheriff, 2011; Duro, 2012a). 
This paper’s aim is thus twofold: firstly, we summarize and order the empirical application of 
inequality approaches to ecological economics. In so doing, we revise the methodologies 
applied and propose the use of decompositions which are usually applied in the main literature. 
We consider the primary aspects which should be taken into account when these methodologies 
(already widely applied to income distributions) are applied to ecological issues; such 
translations are not always direct. Secondly, we analyse empirically the international inequality 
in Ecological Footprint (EF), showing both that it is a more comprehensive indicator than CO2 
emissions (on which analyses of this sort usually focus) and that there is less empirical evidence 
for its distribution (White 2007; Dongjing et al., 2010; Wu and Xu, 2010). Additionally, EF is a 
reliable proxy for critical natural capital, which makes its distributional analysis of deep interest. 
This empirical analysis consists of capturing, in the first place, the main trends in EF inequality 
over 47 years. Next, an additive decomposition is performed in order to distinguish between the 
underlying blocks of the observed inequality (Shorrocks, 1980, 1984). The main findings are 
that, although the observed inequality trend is quite stable and has a positive sign, the source 
decomposition analysis in contrast suggests diminishing inequalities in all EF components 
(carbon footprint, cropland, fishing ground, grazing land, forest, and built-up) - this may be 
caused by weighting issues. Meanwhile, subgroup decomposition shows that the bulk of the 
inequality (around 80%) is explained by the inequality between World Bank groups - this has 
strong policy implications in terms of commitments such as environmental taxation schemes. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the meaning and significance of Ecological 
Footprint as an indicator of natural resource consumption. Section 3 revises the inequality 
approach methodology when the analysis is applied to environmental issues. Section 4 shows 
the empirical application of such methodologies by measuring EF inequality and its 
decompositions. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Ecological Footprint indicator 
A commonplace in ecological economics is the incommensurability problem which deals with 
the fact that is only possible to compare in nature once there is a common denominator 
available
3
. The EF, introduced by (Rees, 1992) and developed by (M. Wackernagel and Rees, 
1996), proposes as common denominator a global bio-productive hectare, where each such 
hectare has the average biological productivity of the whole earth. So then, the question 
becomes how many global hectares a given population uses to maintain its consumption 
patterns; the answer is the Ecological Footprint. 
The Ecological Footprint (EF) accounts for the biosphere regenerative capacity occupied by 
human activities via resource consumption (including household consumption as well as 
collective consumption such as schools, roads, fire brigades, etc.) and waste assimilation (see 
Ewing et al., 2010a, b; Kitzes and Wackernagel, 2009; Kitzes et al., 2009; Monfreda et al., 
2004; Rees, 2000; Wackernagel and Rees, 1996; Wackernagel et al., 2004)
4
. Since both renewal 
and absorption depend on the health and integrity of ecosystems, regenerative capacity is a 
reliable proxy for the life-supporting capacity of natural capital (Monfreda et al., 2004). 
Therefore, this indicator aims to measure the amount of “critical natural capital” (Ekins, 2003; 
Victor, 1991) as it accounts for one of the key aspects of natural capital: the Earth’s ability to 
provide conditions conducive for life.  
The EF framework has been widely used as an indicator of Sustainability as it is compared with 
a country’s bio-capacity. This approach has given rise to a considerable debate, resulting in 
several criticisms of the measure (Fiala, 2008; Van den Bergh and Verbruggen, 1999). Different 
(un)sustainability indicators are available, such as EF, Material Flow Accounts (MFA), human 
appropriation of Net Primary Production (HANPP), etc., each providing different critical 
information in an attempt to assess the complex concept of sustainability. Thus, sustainability 
assessment should accept its complexity and incommensurability and might best be carried out 
by multi-criteria decision making (Kitzes et al., 2009; Martinez-Alier and Roca, 2001). 
Nonetheless, such debates are beyond the scope of this paper since EF is merely used in 
resource consumption measurement as a proxy for critical natural capital. Indeed, any aggregate 
indicator (for example, measures of aggregate economic output) will have both strengths and 
weaknesses, and this also applies to EF. But EF has benefited from academic scrutiny of its 
properties and limitations and this has encouraged its continuous improvement. Its strengths and 
weaknesses are now well known, allowing the interpretation of EF analyses in a transparent and 
unequivocal manner (Caviglia-Harris et al. 2009; Kitzes and Wackernagel, 2009; White, 2007).  
Different methods of country-level EF assessment have been developed for many nations 
(Aubauer, 2011; Bicknell et al., 1998; Ferng, 2001; Monfreda et al., 2004; Van Vuuren and 
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 Money has been used to do so, however money is not a particularly objective instrument for evaluating 
what something is worth, especially for natural capital. See (Martinez-Alier & Roca, 2001; Røpke, 2001). 
Actually, Joan Robinson made the same criticism about capital (Victor, 1991). 
4
 The concept stems from human ecology in the process of defining a suitable way of translating the 
carrying capacity concept to the human species (Rees, 2000). 
Smeets, 2000; Wackernagel and Rees, 1996; Wiedmann et al., 2006). However the most widely 
used methodology for national footprint accounting is Global Footprint Network’s standards 
(Global Footprint Network, 2010), where the accounts are based on a variety of international 
and national data sources, including databases from the United Nation Food and Agricultural 
Organization, the United Nations Statistics division and the International Energy Agency 
(FAOSTAT, UN Comtrade, IEA). Different analyses have been performed using country-EF to 
test different hypotheses such as the Environmental Kuznets curve or the IPAT/STRIPAT 
model (Bagliani et al., 2008; Caviglia-Harris et al., 2009; Dietz et al., 2007; York et al., 2003). 
Additionally, EF has been adopted by a growing number of government authorities, agencies, 
and policy makers as a measure of ecological performance. Notable examples are those 
international applications such as the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2010) and the 
European Parliament and the European Commission (Best et al., 2008), who consider EF to be a 
useful tool for measuring the environmental performance of the EU, or the United Nations 
Development Programme which considers that EF captures the environmental dimension of 
human development (UNDP, 2010). 
EF accounts are made up of six types of land
5
: cropland, grazing land and fishing ground (to 
supply the food and clothes consumed), forest land (for timber and the fuel wood needed), 
energy land (accounting for the uptake of carbon emissions i.e. the carbon footprint)
6
, and 
finally, built-up land (accounting for land covered by human infrastructure). 
∑=
k
kCEF  where k = Cropland, grazing land, fishing ground, forest land, carbon land, built-up 
land. 
The basic equation necessary to develop an intuitive understanding of how EF is calculated is: 
Yield= Tonnes per year/Area – this may be rearranged as Area= Tonnes per year/Yield 
(Wackernagel et al., 2004). More formally: i
W
i
P EQF
Y
T
EF
i
⋅= , where Ti is the annual amount 
harvested or waste emitted for of product I; Yw is the world-average yield for the production of 
each product i, given by all the annual tonnes of product i produced globally, divided by all 
areas in the world on which this product is grown; EQFi is the equivalence factor for the 
production of each product i which is used to translate the actual land area into a world-average 
biologically productive area (Ewing et al., 2010b; Galli et al., 2007). 
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 For the underlying assumptions see (Ewing et al., 2010b). 
6
 EF measures land appropriation by consumed products; some of them appropriate land directly (paper, 
food, housing, etc), while the use of fossil energy included in all products (carbon footprint) is 
appropriated by a fictive and indirect use of land. The idea is to calculate how great an area would be 
needed to replace the use of fossils or to soak up their emissions. In fact, a sustainable economy would 
not drain natural capital, but continuously would produce the energy which is used (Røpke, 2001).   
 
In order to obtain a consumption based indicator of EF, it is necessary to add the EF of imports 
(EFI) and subtract the EF of exports (EFE). In this way, we obtain the EF of consumption (EFC): 
EIPC EFEFEFEF −+=   
In summary, EF captures consumption in terms of land (and sea) regardless of where and when 
is located: a country may be consuming the land of other countries; indeed, the whole world 
may be consuming the land (and sea) of future generations. There is a clear distributional 
content to what is captured by the EF index (Martinez-Alier, 2002) - EF encapsulates in its 
definition unequal relations between countries and generations. Hence, its distributional analysis 
allows us to capture an additional dimension when applied to ecological distribution.  
Data on Ecological Footprint have been taken from (Global Footprint Network, 2010) and they 
cover 119 countries over the period 1961 to 2007. The sample amounts to 90% of the world 
population, 91% of the 2007-GDP and 82% of the World Ecological Footprint
7
. The results 
presented must be read correctly: EF per capita is the EF of the whole country, divided by the 
country’s population; no more, no less! We do not assume that every person within a country 
has the same EF - our focus is on analysing the inequality of resource consumption in a macro-
political way. 
 
3. Inequality and the environment: some basic methodological aspects.  
The development of distributional analysis methods in economics has been tackled in the 
context of Social Welfare Theory (Atkinson, 1970; Theil, 1979; F. Cowell, 1980, 2011; 
Shorrocks, 1980). This focusses on the measurement of income inequality and its direct 
implication for social welfare. Therefore, the methodology applied to analyse environmental 
distribution issues may be borrowed from the income inequality literature. This inequality 
approach application to ecological economics has been applied increasingly in recent years.  
 
3.1 Inequality measurement: partial ordering 
At the root of inequality analysis, we will find that the key issue is the comparison between two 
states in order to decide which one is better off in terms of welfare. Ranking different 
distributions thus become a useful way of making this decision. The Lorenz criterion (second-
order distributional dominance)
8
 is surely the most popular tool for making such a ranking. For 
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 See Appendix table A1 and figure A1 for some descriptive trends in EF per capita levels over the period 
analysed. 
8
 First order dominance criteria are based on the quantiles of the distribution which are given by the 
(generalized) inverse of the distribution function (Pen’s Parade) (Cowell, 2011). This, howver,  is less 
restrictive than second order dominance, and the implications for environmental applications are similar 
to those described for GLC. 
instance, if the Lorenz Curve of EF distribution for 1961 lay wholly inside the EF Lorenz curve 
for 2007, one could assert that 1961 Lorenz-dominates 2007, implying that 1961 has a more 
evenly-spread EF distribution than 2007. However, as can be seen in figure 1 (left), both curves 
intersect, leading to an ambiguous comparison. Yet, even if 1961 had Lorenz-dominated 2007, 
Lorenz curves ignore the average level of EF (or exposure levels of contamination). Hence, it 
may happen that, for instance, even though 80% of the population in 1961 had 57% of the 
whole EF, whereas in 2007 they had only 54%, the latter could involve higher EF level than the 
former (this in fact is what actually occurs. See Figure 1, right). Therefore, it may be 
undesirable to conclude that the 1961 situation is preferable to that of 2007 just because of there 
being more equity (Maguire and Sheriff, 2011). 
Shorrocks (1983a) proved that, by multiplying the original Lorenz curve by its mean, some of 
those intersections could be solved, thus removing its ambiguity; this is the well-known 
Generalized Lorenz Curve (GLC)
9
. In the income literature, this implies that (holding inequality 
constant) the distribution with greater mean will necessary be GLC-dominant (better welfare). 
Unfortunately, the GLC can also yield intersections even when the means are different. Figure 1 
(right) illustrates a situation of non-GLC-dominance. Nevertheless, greater mean income is 
desirable, although greater EF mean is not, since that involves more environmental impact 
(scale goal). Hence, focussing on the low part of the distribution (first and second quintiles), 
2007 exhibits a more desirable situation. In contrast, in the higher parts of the distribution the 
more desirable situation is that of the 1961 distribution. So, using GLC complements 
significantly the information contained in Lorenz Curves. 
To summarize, which year exhibits a more desirable situation depends on which part of the 
distribution is considered more relevant - this necessarily involves value judgements (Atkinson, 
1970; Cowell, 2011; Shorrocks and Foster, 1987). Here, inequality indices show their true worth 
by ranking distributions unambiguously, based on the imposition of specific value judgements. 
Indeed, one of this paper’s aims is actually to argue that such unavoidable value judgements 
should be explicit and in line with the problem being analysed, rather than there being an 
arbitrary selection of index.  
 
Figure 1: Second Order stochastic dominance between 1961 and 2007 using Lorenz 
Curves and Generalized Lorenz Curves (GLC).  
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 While the Lorenz curve consists in ordering by accumulated EF share, the GLC orders by accumulated 
EF. 
Note: The Lorenz Curves intersect at 0.581, 0.635, and 0.99. GLC intersect at 0.423. 
Source: created by the present authors. 
 
3.2 Inequality measurement: Indices 
The literature on the measurement of inequality has identified three basic properties which any 
inequality index should satisfy: scale independence, the population principle and the Pigou-
Dalton Principle of transfers
10
. Most of the more common inequality indices do satisfy such 
basic properties. Consequently, empirical analyses on ecological inequalities usually employ the 
inequality indices commonly used in the income literature; the Gini index (Heil and Wodon, 
1997; Heil and Wodon, 2000; Wu and Xu, 2010; Steinberger et al., 2010), the Theil family 
index (Alcantara and Duro, 2004; Duro and Padilla, 2006; Duro et al., 2010) or the Atkinson 
index (White, 2007; Hedenus and Azar, 2005). In addition, it is also useful that the 
decomposability axiom be satisfied in order to disentangle the main contributions to the Total 
inequality (see Section 4). Authors take advantage of the properties of such indices in order to 
unambiguously analyse inequalities in environmental impact indicators.  
Nonetheless, these indices were built axiomatically based on several assumptions which fit well 
for the measurement of income inequality, but which do not necessarily fit so well for 
ecological variables. In line with this, it is worth considering a remarkable property which 
usually is present in many inequality indices: the Diminishing Transfer Principle (Kolm, 1976). 
In the income framework, the society will value more “positively” a concrete increase of 
income for a poor individual than for a rich one
11
 (i.e. inequality index will decrease more when 
there is a fixed transfer to a relatively poor individual than when the same transfer is made to a 
relatively richer person). This rationale does not make such sense when, for example, that 
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 Three basic properties (Goerlich, 1998): scale-independence: the inequality measure remains unaltered 
by changes of the same proportion in all the observations. Population independence: the inequality index 
remains unchanged with replications of the population. Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers: any transfer 
from an observation (country) with a high level of a variable to an observation (country) at a lower level 
(which does not invert the relative rankings) should reduce the value of the inequality index.  
11
 The reason will be found in the concavity of the implicit Social Welfare Function 
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transfer is in terms of pollution! Hence, the particular sensitivity of the different indices to the 
location where distributive changes take place must be taken into account when environmental 
outcomes are being analysed.  
Table 1. Summary of inequality indices considered and their characteristics 
Index Formula Basic axioms Decomposability Transfer-Sensitivity 
Variance ∑
=
−=
1
22 )( 
i
ii yp µσ ω  No Yes Neutral 
Gini ∑∑ −=
i j
jiji yyppG µ2
1
 Yes  No On the mode 
CV2 
2
2
2
µ
σ ω
ω =CV  Yes Yes Neutral.  
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2
1
)2(
2
µ
 Yes Yes Neutral 
Notes: pi is the population share of country i, yi is the per capita variable of interest, µ is the mean of the variable of 
interest and ε is the inequality aversion parameter. 
Source: Present authors. 
The Gini Index, though not explicitly defined, has more sensitivity to transfers occurring close 
to the distribution mode. GE indices (when β<2) have more sensitivity to the low part of the 
distribution. The inequality aversion parameter, ε, in Atkinson indices also weights the low parts 
of the distributions more (as long as ε>0)12. On the other hand, weighting the top of the 
distribution more is not really suited to environmental analysis. Therefore, as Duro (2012a) 
proposes, neutral measures (i.e. a fixed transfer is weighted identically independently of where 
it occurs) become more appealing choices when there is no obligation to favour any particular 
part of the distribution. These are GE(2) and its cardinal equivalents such as CV
2 13
.  
Choosing neutral indices, however, is not free of empirical implications. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of inequality in the course of the period analysed according to different well known 
indices
14
. Despite all them sharing a similar pattern, it is remarkable that the significant 
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 When −∞→β  or ∞→ε  the distribution tends to be assessed according to Rawls, only the lowest 
observation mattering 
13
  2
2
1
)2( CVGE =  (Goerlich, 1998) 
14
 See Annex, Table A2, forthe inequality indices. 
differences in growth rates observed depend on the index used. Firstly, the Gini index is 
considerably more stable than the other indices. The main reason for such behaviour must be 
attributed to the distribution mode preference of the Gini index. GE(0) favours the low part of 
the distribution - as does GE(1) - while GE(2) and CV
2
 are neutral indices
15
. Moreover, a 
detailed observation of Figure 2 will show that, in some periods, the indices even indicate 
different signs for the inequality trend: in the period 1980-82 neutral indices (CV
2
-GE(2)) show 
a clear increase in observed inequality whereas GE(0), GE(1) and Gini show a slim decrease. In 
contrast, during the periods 1986-87 and 1998-2000, a reduction in inequality is shown by 
neutral indices whereas the Gini, Theil (i.e. GE(0) and GE(1)) and Atkinson indices indicate an 
increase in the observed inequality. 
Figure 2. Inequality trends in EF according to the main inequality indices (1961 – 2007) 
 
Note: 1961=100 for all indices 
Source: Present Authors. 
As a result, the inequality trend in EF displays a quite stable pattern of global growth in the long 
term when we consider the whole period (from 1961 to 2007). Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
some particular episodes: during the first twenty years of the analysed period, there was a 
significant increase in the EF inequality. Once the 80s had passed, the inequality shows a 
tendency toward a slight decrease, this being more noticeable from 2003 onwards. The heavy 
industrialization of super-populated China in the last decades has had an equalizing effect on the 
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 The coincidence in rates is due to cardinality equivalence. 
EF distribution
16
, India has behaved similarly. However, apparent inequality stability can hide 
different underlying trends, as will be shown by decomposition techniques. 
 
3.3 Weights and inequality changes 
The scale impact of humankind on the environment, here measured by EF, is a function of both 
growing population and of growing per capita consumption. Sustainability is thus not only 
about accommodating more people, but also about accommodating “larger” people (Catton 
1986, Rees, 2000). The analysis of EF inequality consists in measuring differences in per capita 
natural resource consumption weighted by (relative) populations. 
Consider a world where there are only two countries, A and B. Country A is the only one 
responsible for environmental impact on the earth, country B having no environmental impact, 
since they live in a completely sustainable way. Subsequently, country A continues to have 
exactly the same environmental impact per capita with a lower relative population (either 
because of increasing population in country B or because of migration processes). Figure 3 
shows that this two-country world has an increase in inequality due to weighting factors even 
with no change in the impact per capita vector. Similarly, an increase of relative population in 
country A would involve a reduction of inequality  
Figure 3. Lorenz curves of two-country world with change in relative population. 
 
Source: Present authors 
Thus, although the per capita EF of the average Belgian and the average US citizen are equal, 
both countries are not weighted equally because of the large difference in their populations
17
. 
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 The same analysis as shown in Figure 2 has been performed, excluding China from the sample. These 
results show an uninterrupted increase in the EF inequality. This is consistent with Duro and Padilla 
(2006), where the reducing trend in CO2 emissions inequality was found to be less evident without China 
and India in the sample. 
17
 In 2007, the per capita EF of both Belgium and the USA was 8.00, whereas the world population share 
of each was of 1% and 17% respectively. 
p 
L(p) 
However, if the US population decreased until it represented the same share population share as 
Belgium, the per capita EF inequality would reduce in Lorenz terms
18
; less accumulated 
population would entail less accumulated EF. We would like to stress in this section that such 
inequality reduction has occurred without any change in per capita consumption habits of either 
US or Belgium citizens (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of real EF Lorenz curve with a fictitious EF Lorenz curve which 
assumes the US has Belgium’s population share. 
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Source: Present Authors. 
For the Lorenz-based indices we are using, the weight of each country is the relative 
population
19
. Despite the role such weights may play on inequality measurement, they have not 
received enough attention in empirical analyses (Duro 2012b). An increase of EF inequality in 
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 Any Lorenz consistent index will reduce. 
19
 In the income literature, the comparisons are made over the so-called “equivalent income” concept, 
which takes into account different needs among households (such as different personal attributes or 
different household sizes, etc). So in analyses across countries, those different needs are typically 
weighted by population. In this sense, weighted measures are more realistic than non-weighted indexes, in 
so far as population weights avoid the impact on the inequality values attributable to very small 
observations. 
the course of the whole period (as is actually the case), typically will be interpreted as a result of 
greater differences within the per capita EF vector. Nonetheless, such an increase in inequality 
may stem from changes in weighting vectors (i.e. the relative population vector). 
Consequently, international inequalities on this basis may be attributable not only to changes in 
per capita environmental impact, but also to changes on the structure of relative weights
20
. In 
order to capture such a weighting factor role, the EF inequality change can be decomposed in 
the following way: 
{ } { }),(),(),(),(),(),( 111111 ++++++ +−=− tttttttttttt EFpIEFpIEFpIEFpIEFpIEFpI    (1) 
where p and EF are the relative population and per capita EF at time t and t+1, while I(.) is a 
Lorenz-consistent inequality index. The first term of the expression would reflect the change in 
inequality caused by changes in per capita EF vector, since relative population remains constant. 
The second term would correspond to the role played by changes in the relative populations, 
given that the per capita EF vector remains constant. Accordingly, the inequality change can be 
decomposed by per capita EF share and population share. 
Table 2 shows the main results of such a decomposition made over different periods. In general, 
the main role in inequality change is played by changes in per capita EF vector. For instance, 
from 1961 to 1971 inequality grew by 58% according to neutral indices. This growth rate was 
95% due to changes in per capita EF, while only 5% of it was due to weighting factor changes. 
Nevertheless, according to the remaining indices whose sensitivities are to specific parts of the 
distribution, the role played by changes in weights was negative, - this means that such changes 
(located in low EF countries) contribute significantly to equalizing the distribution. In contrast, 
when a reduction of EF inequality is observed (see 2001-2007), the changes in relative 
populations contribute to making the resulting distribution less equal, i.e. the per capita EF 
vector contributes highly to a more evenly spread distribution, whereas the weighting factor 
contributes marginally to a more unequal distribution.  
Despite results suggesting that the main contributor to inequality changes is per capita EF, the 
weighting factor role must be taken into account since it makes its own contribution to the 
inequality trend, especially when the whole inequality change is of low magnitude (such as in 
short periods
21
). In such scenarios, the weighting factor role can drive the bulk of inequality 
change (for example, 1991-2001).  
 Table 2. Decomposing International EF inequality changes by population share changes and by per capita EF changes by sub-periods of 10 years 
 CV2   GE(2)   GINI   GE(0)   GE(1)   A(1)   A(0.5)   
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 Duro 2012b shows that in in some cases, changes in relative population play a significant role in 
explaining the inequality change in per capita CO2 emissions and energy intensities.  
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 See Table A3 in annex 
Ineq. Index 1961 0.4436   0.2218   0.3319   0.1792   0.1890   0.1641   0.0888   
Total change 1961-1971 0.2572   0.1286   0.0717   0.0866   0.0945   0.0693   0.0415   
Growth rate 58%   58%   22%   48%   50%   42%   47%   
per c. EF share  0.2433 (95%) 0.1216 (95%) 0.0762 (106%) 0.0946 (109%) 0.0962 (102%) 0.0755 (109%) 0.0437 (105%) 
rel.pop. share 0.0139 (5%) 0.0069 (5%) -0.0045 (-6%) -0.0080 (-9%) -0.0016 (-2%) -0.0061 (-9%) -0.0022 (-5%) 
Ineq. Index 1971 0.7007   0.3504   0.4036   0.2658   0.2836   0.2334   0.1303   
Total change 1971-1981 -0.0017   -0.0009   -0.0010   -0.0028   -0.0031   -0.0022   -0.0015   
Growth rate 0%   0%   0%   -1%   -1%   -1%   -1%   
per c. EF share -0.0115 (667%) -0.0058 (667%) 0.0037 (-376%) 0.0053 (-189%) -0.0004 (12%) 0.0040 (-188%) 0.0010 (-68%) 
rel.pop. share 0.0098 (-567%) 0.0049 (-567%) -0.0046 (476%) -0.0081 (289%) -0.0028 (88%) -0.0062 (288%) -0.0025 (168%) 
Ineq. Index 1981 0.6990   0.3495   0.4026   0.2630   0.2804   0.2313   0.1288   
Total change 1981-1991 -0.0559   -0.0279 (-8%) -0.0157   -0.0207   -0.0217   -0.0161   -0.0098   
Growth rate -8%   -8%   -4%   -8%   -8%   -7%   -8%   
per c. EF share -0.0675 (121%) -0.0337 (121%) -0.0122 (78%) -0.0149 (72%) -0.0206 (95%) -0.0115 (72%) -0.0081 (83%) 
rel.pop. share 0.0116 (-21%) 0.0058 (-21%) -0.0035 (22%) -0.0058 (28%) -0.0011 (5%) -0.0045 (28%) -0.0017 (17%) 
Ineq. index 1991 0.6431   0.3216   0.3869   0.2423   0.2588   0.2152   0.1191   
Total change 1991-2001 0.0344   0.0172   0.0045   0.0068   0.0081   0.0053   0.0032   
Growth rate 5%   5%   1%   3%   3%   2%   3%   
per c. EF share 0.0151 (44%) 0.0075 (44%) 0.0037 (82%) 0.0065 (96%) 0.0048 (59%) 0.0051 (96%) 0.0024 (75%) 
rel.pop. share 0.0193 (56%) 0.0097 (56%) 0.0008 (18%) 0.0002 (4%) 0.0033 (41%) 0.0002 (4%) 0.0008 (25%) 
Ineq. Index 2001 0.6775   0.3388   0.3914   0.2491   0.2669   0.2205   0.1223   
Total change 2001-2007 -0.0925   -0.0463   -0.0139   -0.0155   -0.0259   -0.0122   -0.0095   
Growth rate -14%   -14%   -4%   -6%   -10%   -6%   -8%   
per c. EF share -0.1038 (112%) -0.0519 (112%) -0.0157 (113%) -0.0170 (109%) -0.0289 (111%) -0.0133 (109%) -0.0105 (110%) 
rel.pop. share 0.0113 (-12%) 0.0056 (-12%) 0.0018 (-13%) 0.0014 (-9%) 0.0029 (-11%) 0.0011 (-9%) 0.0010 (-10%) 
Ineq. Index 2007 0.5850   0.2925   0.3775   0.2335   0.2410   0.2083   0.1128   
Source: Present Authors. 
Consequently, the international inequality in per capita EF can be a consequence not only of 
changing (growing) per capita EF, but also of changing (growing) population. Nonetheless, the 
analysis indicates that the EF inequality trend observed is mainly attributable to the per capita 
EF vector rather than to the relative population vector. This means that the resulting EF 
inequality derives from differences in the “ecological size” of the average citizen in different 
countries, rather than from the world population structure.  
  
4. Additive Decomposition analyses 
Additive decomposition analysis turns to be a very useful in measuring and understanding the 
level, causes and development of observed inequalities – topics of considerable current interest. 
Decomposing an index consists of determining which part of the total inequality observed is 
attributable to each of its components - such information may be critical for policy making. 
However, a necessary condition for doing this is the satisfaction of an extra property: 
decomposability (Bourguignon, 1979; Cowell, 2000; 2011). This property implies that there 
should be a coherent relationship between the whole inequality observed and its constituent 
parts. Such a property additionally restricts the available inequality indices to a concrete family: 
Generalized Entropy indices or some cardinally-equivalent transformation. There are two 
classic ways of additively decomposing the global inequality: subgroup decomposition and 
source decomposition
22
. 
 
4.1 Subgroup decomposition 
This consists in determining the contribution to the total inequality of each of the different 
mutually exclusive subgroups in the population. Here, the inequality can be expressed as the 
sum of the inequality between groups and the weighted inequality within those groups. The 
between component is the inequality which would exist if each member of the group had the 
average EF of that group. On the hand, the within component consists of the inequality which 
would be observed if the inequality between groups did not exist, so that the within inequality is 
the existing inequality in each group weighted by the population or pollution share. It takes the 
form 
∑ +=
G
g
gg III 0ω                                                                                   (2) 
where ),( gggg ypωω = , g=1,G, are the weights for each within inequality, pg and yg being the 
relative population and the relative EF, respectively. Translating that expression to GE indices, 
we obtain (Shorrocks, 1980, 1984): 
∑ +=
G
g
gg GEGEGE )()()( 0 ββωβ                                      (3) 
where 
ββω ggg yp
−
=
1
. So, only for β =1 or β =0 (Theil indices) may the weights be read as 
population proportions (β =0) or EF proportions (β =1). The case for β ≠0, 1 leads to a problem 
of interpretation since the weights are a non-linear combination of population and pollution 
shares, and those weights do not add to one. Furthermore, given that the decomposition for β=1 
corresponds to weighting observations by relative EF instead of by relative population, it is 
important to keep in mind that conceptually, the between inequality as defined above would 
involve transfers among observations, which could also lead to interpretation problems. For that 
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 Despite existing different techniques being available in the literature, this paper will use the analytical 
decomposition approach (Bourguignon, 1979; F. A. Cowell, 1980; A. F. Shorrocks, 1980; A. F. 
Shorrocks, 1982) and the Shaply value decomposition (Sastre & Trannoy, 2002; A. F. Shorrocks, 1999). 
Regression-based decomposition is becoming popular as a useful tool for decomposing the inequality - 
however it can decompose inequality by explanatory factors defined  as is common in regressions, so that 
it requires more and different data and, hence, is beyond of the scope of this paper (see F. A. Cowell & 
Fiorio, 2009; Fields, 2003; Morduch & Sicular, 2002). A wide-ranging review of  inequality 
decompositions may be found in (Heshmati, 2004) 
reason, the Theil measure with β =0 is the most unambiguous solution (see Goerlich, 1998; 
Shorrocks, 1980) 
Subgroup decomposition has been performed using exogenous groups of countries such as those 
defined by the World Bank
23
. Table 3 illustrates this decomposition using three GE indices. The 
main result is that the bulk of the inequality during the analysed period is largely explained by 
the between inequality component (between 83%-88% according to GE(0)). Therefore, it could 
be said that the inequality in EF would be drastically reduced if differences among groups were 
eliminated, or equivalently, that if the inequality within groups were null, there would be no 
significant reduction in global inequality. Such an empirical finding has important policy 
implications in terms of achieving international agreements. In the light of these results, the 
probability of achieving broader and deeper consensus would increase if, instead of holding 
international meetings where all countries participate, the framework were in regional terms 
such as those defined by World Bank groups (assuming there are no other political issues on the 
table within these regions). This is because inequality within these groups is not so marked. 
It is also worthwhile analysing the very evolution of these between (within) differences. 
Looking in in more detail at the subgroup decomposition of GE(0) (Table 3, left), we see that 
the between-group component displays an inverted U-shape in the course of the period: in 1961 
it accounted for 83% of the EF inequality. This between factor grows to 88% in 1972 and stays 
around 86-87% until the beginning of the 90s - it then shrinks to 81% of the overall inequality 
in 2007. On the other hand, also in Table 3 (middle and right), there are the same subgroup 
decompositions for both GE(1) and the neutral index GE(2). The Between component of GE(1) 
shows a similar tendency as that described for GE(0), although it exhibits some differences 
which may be explained, on the one hand, by a sensitivity to different parts of the distribution 
and, on the other, to different weights for countries. GE(1), as described above, corresponds to 
weight contributions by EF where GE(0) does this by population. In contrast, GE(2) cannot be 
interpreted in this manner, it is a neutral index. The Between component of GE(2) shows a more 
drastic increase in its contribution to the overall EF inequality: from 73% in 1961 to 86% to 
1991, after which there is a slight reduction to 81% by 2007. Despite the differences in the 
groups used to decompose inequality in other studies which also use different indicators, the 
pattern observed in the between-component (and inversely in the within-component) usually 
shows drastic decreasing for either CO2 emissions (Duro and Padilla 2006; Padilla and Serrano 
2006) or energy intensities (Alcantara and Duro 2004).  
 
Table 3. Decomposition by country subgroups using World Bank geographical groups. T(0), T(1) and GE(2).  
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 World Bank groups are: East-Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Industrial 
countries, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
  Between I. GE(0) Between I. GE(1) Between I. GE(2) 
year Within 
I. 
% Between 
I. 
% T(0) Within 
I.  
% Between 
I. 
% T(1) Within 
I. 
% Between 
I. 
% T(2) 
1961 0.0305 17% 0.1487 83% 0.1792 0.0386 20% 0.1505 80% 0.1891 0.0599 27% 0.1619 73% 0.2218 
1962 0.0301 16% 0.1581 84% 0.1883 0.0377 19% 0.1607 81% 0.1984 0.0586 25% 0.1746 75% 0.2331 
1963 0.0300 15% 0.1659 85% 0.1959 0.0386 19% 0.1685 81% 0.2070 0.0622 25% 0.1836 75% 0.2458 
1964 0.0299 15% 0.1635 85% 0.1934 0.0380 19% 0.1668 81% 0.2048 0.0602 25% 0.1824 75% 0.2425 
1965 0.0301 15% 0.1757 85% 0.2058 0.0380 17% 0.1796 83% 0.2176 0.0605 23% 0.1981 77% 0.2586 
1966 0.0318 15% 0.1833 85% 0.2151 0.0401 18% 0.1876 82% 0.2277 0.0660 24% 0.2082 76% 0.2743 
1967 0.0298 14% 0.1907 86% 0.2205 0.0374 16% 0.1961 84% 0.2335 0.0599 21% 0.2192 79% 0.2791 
1968 0.0316 13% 0.2051 87% 0.2368 0.0416 16% 0.2125 84% 0.2541 0.0721 23% 0.2408 77% 0.3129 
1969 0.0338 14% 0.2153 86% 0.2491 0.0430 16% 0.2238 84% 0.2668 0.0735 22% 0.2557 78% 0.3291 
1970 0.0312 13% 0.2158 87% 0.2470 0.0374 14% 0.2256 86% 0.2629 0.0604 19% 0.2595 81% 0.3199 
1971 0.0344 13% 0.2314 87% 0.2658 0.0423 15% 0.2413 85% 0.2836 0.0715 20% 0.2789 80% 0.3504 
1972 0.0340 12% 0.2415 88% 0.2755 0.0408 14% 0.2520 86% 0.2928 0.0684 19% 0.2929 81% 0.3613 
1973 0.0358 13% 0.2489 87% 0.2847 0.0421 14% 0.2621 86% 0.3041 0.0707 19% 0.3085 81% 0.3792 
1974 0.0341 12% 0.2401 88% 0.2742 0.0395 14% 0.2498 86% 0.2893 0.0650 18% 0.2898 82% 0.3548 
1975 0.0346 13% 0.2234 87% 0.2581 0.0422 15% 0.2349 85% 0.2771 0.0715 21% 0.2731 79% 0.3446 
1976 0.0366 13% 0.2405 87% 0.2771 0.0437 15% 0.2531 85% 0.2968 0.0743 20% 0.2969 80% 0.3712 
1977 0.0361 13% 0.2438 87% 0.2800 0.0438 15% 0.2577 85% 0.3015 0.0761 20% 0.3044 80% 0.3805 
1978 0.0381 14% 0.2417 86% 0.2798 0.0453 15% 0.2553 85% 0.3006 0.0776 20% 0.3020 80% 0.3796 
1979 0.0376 13% 0.2497 87% 0.2873 0.0440 14% 0.2634 86% 0.3074 0.0756 19% 0.3130 81% 0.3886 
1980 0.0343 13% 0.2342 87% 0.2685 0.0374 13% 0.2450 87% 0.2825 0.0580 17% 0.2868 83% 0.3448 
1981 0.0374 14% 0.2255 86% 0.2630 0.0437 16% 0.2368 84% 0.2805 0.0722 21% 0.2773 79% 0.3495 
1982 0.0374 14% 0.2252 86% 0.2626 0.0442 16% 0.2363 84% 0.2805 0.0747 21% 0.2775 79% 0.3523 
1983 0.0342 15% 0.2006 85% 0.2348 0.0379 15% 0.2129 85% 0.2508 0.0577 19% 0.2500 81% 0.3078 
1984 0.0369 14% 0.2195 86% 0.2564 0.0424 15% 0.2336 85% 0.2760 0.0695 20% 0.2779 80% 0.3473 
1985 0.0363 14% 0.2269 86% 0.2632 0.0427 15% 0.2425 85% 0.2852 0.0727 20% 0.2912 80% 0.3639 
1986 0.0338 13% 0.2248 87% 0.2586 0.0390 14% 0.2406 86% 0.2797 0.0650 18% 0.2891 82% 0.3541 
1987 0.0340 13% 0.2280 87% 0.2619 0.0370 13% 0.2439 87% 0.2808 0.0587 17% 0.2936 83% 0.3524 
1988 0.0338 14% 0.2146 86% 0.2483 0.0345 13% 0.2317 87% 0.2662 0.0506 15% 0.2801 85% 0.3307 
1989 0.0349 14% 0.2221 86% 0.2570 0.0366 13% 0.2422 87% 0.2787 0.0563 16% 0.2967 84% 0.3531 
1990 0.0338 13% 0.2225 87% 0.2564 0.0340 12% 0.2427 88% 0.2767 0.0511 15% 0.2988 85% 0.3499 
1991 0.0348 14% 0.2075 86% 0.2423 0.0334 13% 0.2253 87% 0.2588 0.0466 14% 0.2750 86% 0.3215 
1992 0.0362 15% 0.2128 85% 0.2490 0.0377 14% 0.2342 86% 0.2720 0.0603 17% 0.2902 83% 0.3506 
1993 0.0366 16% 0.1934 84% 0.2300 0.0361 15% 0.2080 85% 0.2441 0.0512 17% 0.2514 83% 0.3026 
1994 0.0394 16% 0.2048 84% 0.2442 0.0398 15% 0.2227 85% 0.2625 0.0589 18% 0.2733 82% 0.3322 
1995 0.0382 16% 0.1986 84% 0.2368 0.0368 15% 0.2139 85% 0.2506 0.0499 16% 0.2600 84% 0.3099 
1996 0.0402 17% 0.1988 83% 0.2389 0.0392 16% 0.2116 84% 0.2508 0.0550 18% 0.2552 82% 0.3103 
1997 0.0402 16% 0.2036 84% 0.2438 0.0406 16% 0.2204 84% 0.2610 0.0597 18% 0.2702 82% 0.3298 
1998 0.0347 14% 0.2108 86% 0.2455 0.0361 13% 0.2312 87% 0.2672 0.0568 17% 0.2872 83% 0.3440 
1999 0.0387 16% 0.2072 84% 0.2459 0.0403 15% 0.2273 85% 0.2677 0.0608 18% 0.2823 82% 0.3431 
2000 0.0372 15% 0.2116 85% 0.2488 0.0375 14% 0.2308 86% 0.2684 0.0560 16% 0.2866 84% 0.3427 
2001 0.0393 16% 0.2097 84% 0.2490 0.0392 15% 0.2278 85% 0.2670 0.0569 17% 0.2819 83% 0.3388 
2002 0.0396 16% 0.2118 84% 0.2514 0.0391 15% 0.2282 85% 0.2673 0.0558 17% 0.2810 83% 0.3368 
2003 0.0399 16% 0.2073 84% 0.2472 0.0398 15% 0.2241 85% 0.2639 0.0582 17% 0.2763 83% 0.3345 
2004 0.0412 16% 0.2126 84% 0.2539 0.0409 15% 0.2279 85% 0.2688 0.0598 18% 0.2801 82% 0.3399 
2005 0.0412 17% 0.2077 83% 0.2489 0.0409 16% 0.2214 84% 0.2623 0.0600 18% 0.2709 82% 0.3309 
2006 0.0446 19% 0.1949 81% 0.2394 0.0425 17% 0.2049 83% 0.2474 0.0573 19% 0.2460 81% 0.3034 
2007 0.0440 19% 0.1896 81% 0.2336 0.0423 18% 0.1986 82% 0.2409 0.0555 19% 0.2369 81% 0.2925 
Source: Present Authors. 
We have discussed the fact that GE(2) is the inequality index which, because of its neutrality 
property, is in best accord with this paper’s aim. However, we have also shown that the best 
choice for decomposing such an inequality by subgroups is GE(0). Hence, we must be careful 
and consider the minutiae of each index when interpreting any results obtained by subgroup 
decomposition. Nevertheless, as far as our empirical results are concerned, the three subgroup 
decompositions performed by EF are quite close and, since they point to the same conclusion, 
this makes this conclusion quite robust.  
4.2 The source decomposition  
Source decomposition aims to quantify how much EF inequality can be attributed to different 
EF components – this may have deep policy implications for the achievement of equity. 
However, the contribution of a component to the whole inequality can adopt different forms 
(see Shorrocks, 1982; 1988). It can be stated that the contribution of component k to the overall 
inequality is three-fold, consisting of: the component’s inequality, the component’s share in 
whole EF, and the correlation between components. 
It may be instructive to begin by considering the inequality of each EF component. Indeed, that 
may be regarded as a component’s contribution to overall EF inequality
24
. Table 4 shows the 
GE(2) for each EF component. The Fishing, Forest, and Built footprints show stable trends, 
with a relatively high inequality for Fishing. On the other hand, the Cropland footprint exhibits 
a quite stable low inequality trend (a slight reduction); such a low inequality in the Cropland 
footprint could be indicative of the special status of some biomass consumption from cropland 
(food and fibre for human consumption), this being necessary for the most basic subsistence 
(Steinberger et al., 2010). In contrast, the Grazing footprint inequality, despite also registering a 
reduction in the course of the period, always remains the most unequal distribution as compared 
to the remaining EF components. The explanation of such a high inequality may be found in the 
meat-intensive diets of industrialized countries (White, 2000). Finally, the Carbon footprint 
inequality displays a significant reduction during the period - this is consistent with the findings 
of Padilla and Serrano (2006), Ezcurra (2007), Heil and Wodon (1997) and Heil and Wodon 
(2000) who analyse CO2 emissions inequality
25
.  
In 1961, the most unequal distributions of footprint were for grazing, followed by carbon and 
then by fishing. However, by the end of 2007, the ranking shows grazing as still the being the 
most unequal, but now followed by fishing rather than carbon, which becomes the third most 
unequal distribution. Hence, the most unequal distributions, and thus the main contributors to 
EF inequality, according to this relatively simplistic interpretation, are diet-related issues 
followed by a decreasing energy-related issue.  
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  It is a common practice in the empirical literature to use each component’s inequality as  a contribution 
to the overall inequality (see Shorrocks 1988). Actually, Steinberger et al. (2010) analysed international 
inequality in  Domestic Material Consumption and the inequality of its components (biomass DMC, 
construction minerals DMC, ores/industrial minerals DMC and fossil fuels DMC). Chen and Ma (2010) 
analysed international inequality of Ecological Footprint and also the inequality of two aggregated 
subcomponents: Renewable Resources Footprint and Energy Footprint.    
25
 Steineberger et al. (2010) estimated the Gini index of Domestic Material Consumption (DMC) and of 
its different components (biomass, construction minerals, fossil fuels, ores/industrial minerals) for the 
year 2000. Despite both indicators sharing raw data, the results obtained are not comparable, since the 
indicators deal with different research questions and so are constructed differently. EF focuses mainly on 
biomass consumption. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe some relatively similar results: the Gini 
coefficient for total DMC is 0.35 and the Gini coefficient in the same year of EF is 0.39; the Gini 
coefficient for fossil fuels DMC is 0.58 while the Gini coefficient for Carbon Footprint for our data is 
0.576. Additionally, if the Cropland, forest, grazing, and fishing footprints are added together in order to 
construct a “pure biomass footprint”, the resulting Gini coefficient for 2000 would be 0.300, very close to 
the 0.29 Gini for Biomass Material Consumption of the Steinberger et al. paper. Therefore, our analysis is 
in line with that of Steinberger et al. 2010, while adding new which are compatible. Our calculations are 
available on request.  
Table 4. GE(2) for per capita EF components, 1961-2007 
Year Fishing Cropland Grazing  Forest  Carbon Built  
1961 0.9997 0.1465 1.7905 0.4863 1.4592 0.1803 
1962 1.0482 0.1455 1.8151 0.4861 1.4503 0.1813 
1963 1.0365 0.1517 1.7664 0.4707 1.4120 0.1691 
1964 0.9558 0.1271 1.7351 0.4788 1.4383 0.1732 
1965 1.0003 0.1332 1.7172 0.4824 1.4194 0.1608 
1966 0.9738 0.1281 1.6214 0.4694 1.4166 0.1555 
1967 1.0892 0.1361 1.6404 0.4541 1.4707 0.1793 
1968 1.0377 0.1484 1.6601 0.4513 1.4596 0.1638 
1969 0.9912 0.1555 1.7041 0.4561 1.4028 0.1569 
1970 1.0205 0.1230 1.7050 0.4530 1.2936 0.1519 
1971 1.0003 0.1577 1.7919 0.4884 1.2702 0.1591 
1972 1.0469 0.1620 1.8830 0.4456 1.2940 0.1688 
1973 0.9507 0.1424 1.8276 0.4891 1.2770 0.1591 
1974 0.9328 0.1347 2.0625 0.4710 1.2573 0.1614 
1975 0.8952 0.1477 2.2071 0.4490 1.1857 0.1502 
1976 1.0011 0.1535 1.9760 0.4545 1.2014 0.1323 
1977 0.9650 0.1664 1.8776 0.4511 1.2101 0.1537 
1978 0.8711 0.1532 1.7607 0.4892 1.1715 0.1519 
1979 0.8311 0.1640 1.6985 0.5048 1.1442 0.1633 
1980 0.9751 0.1607 1.7188 0.4645 1.0931 0.1663 
1981 0.9443 0.1528 1.6555 0.4549 1.0860 0.1650 
1982 1.0136 0.2665 1.6433 0.4050 1.0384 0.1744 
1983 0.9520 0.1437 1.5238 0.4589 1.0392 0.1536 
1984 0.9053 0.1563 1.6245 0.4975 1.0521 0.1844 
1985 1.1217 0.1746 1.7650 0.4983 1.0373 0.1635 
1986 1.1034 0.1613 1.7775 0.5277 1.0233 0.1567 
1987 1.1545 0.1490 1.6340 0.5483 1.0416 0.1616 
1988 1.1171 0.1434 1.4993 0.5433 0.9940 0.1582 
1989 1.1301 0.1309 1.5891 0.5482 0.9808 0.1574 
1990 0.9568 0.1404 1.6072 0.5124 0.9509 0.1388 
1991 0.9772 0.1369 1.6033 0.4501 0.9130 0.1603 
1992 0.9724 0.1391 1.4900 0.4625 1.0062 0.1547 
1993 0.9185 0.1245 1.5145 0.4706 0.8252 0.1482 
1994 0.8977 0.1372 1.4504 0.4802 0.8704 0.1434 
1995 0.9848 0.1233 1.3874 0.4910 0.8231 0.1537 
1996 0.9024 0.1136 1.4505 0.4583 0.7598 0.1565 
1997 0.9457 0.1038 1.3730 0.4763 0.8239 0.1576 
1998 0.8736 0.1096 1.3955 0.4966 0.8851 0.1624 
1999 0.9780 0.1075 1.3522 0.4823 0.8832 0.1708 
2000 0.9780 0.1061 1.3414 0.4958 0.8561 0.1664 
2001 1.0859 0.1063 1.3608 0.4773 0.8445 0.1574 
2002 0.9842 0.1165 1.3106 0.4970 0.8656 0.1813 
2003 0.9323 0.1204 1.3039 0.4815 0.8050 0.1405 
2004 0.9191 0.1265 1.2927 0.5010 0.7752 0.1529 
2005 0.8226 0.1161 1.2583 0.5585 0.7321 0.1405 
2006 0.7943 0.1040 1.1924 0.4729 0.6824 0.1302 
2007 0.7820 0.1060 1.2286 0.4592 0.6199 0.1296 
Source: Present Authors. 
The component’s inequality does not take into account the weight of each component in the EF, 
so, despite providing critical information, this approach does not distinguish the relative 
importance of having a high inequality in a component which accounts for 99% share of EF 
versus having a high inequality in the component which accounts for 1% share of EF. Hence, 
the second issue which must be considered in accounting for component’s k contribution is its 
weight (importance) in the EF. Along these lines, any contribution to inequality consists of a 
weighted inequality index of each component.  
By definition, EF can be broken down into the sum of its components, i.e. 
∑
=
=
K
k
kii CEF
1
,                                                                                (4) 
where subindex k indicates each EF Component (cropland, grazing land, fishing ground, forest 
land, carbon land, built-up land) and subindex i indicates country. The idea behind the weighted 
source decomposition is thus to break down overall EF inequality into the part for which each 
EF component is responsible. Therefore, the source decomposition will have the form 
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where Sk is the absolute contribution of component Ck to the overall EF inequality which is a 
function of the component’s inequality I(Ck) and its weight (or importance) λk in the EF, µk and 
µ being the k
th
 component’s mean and EF’s mean respectively. If we normalize it by the 
inequality index, the relative contribution will be obtained, i.e.  
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Such a decomposition of an inequality index has several technical problems which will lead us 
to consider the role of correlations among components. We illustrate this by the most famous 
and widely used weighted decomposition, the natural decomposition of Gini index proposed by 
Fei et al. (1978)
26
.  
Such decomposition is based on weighting pseudo-Gini indices
27
 of the different components. If 
real Gini indices were used instead to measure a component’s inequality, the equality in 
equation 5 would not hold any more unless the rankings of overall EF and its components 
happened to coincide, that is to say unless EF and its components were perfectly correlated. 
This, of course, rarely happens, and so the decomposition would not be consistent
28
. Therefore, 
the problem with Gini decomposition by sources is the necessity of using pseudo-Ginis to make 
the source decomposition consistent
29
. However, such an approach makes the contribution of 
component k independent of its own distribution and dependent on the aggregate variable 
distribution (here EF). This is what a pseudo-Gini actually is. As a result, the source 
                                                 
26
 White (2007) used this methodology in decomposing EF. 
27
 Also known as concentration indices: this is to rank the distribution of the different components 
according to the ranking performed by the aggregate factor.  
28
 Specifically, the sum of the weighted k factor inequalities would be greater than the inequality of the 
aggregate (see Goerlich, 1998, Shorrocks 1982, 1983; Cowell 2000). This result happens because of the 
correlations among components 
29
 The procedure can also be extended to inequality measures other than the Gini coefficient (Shorrocks, 
1983). 
decomposition turns out to be an uninteresting and trivial exercise. In fact, without further 
restriction on the decomposition rule, the results obtained are non-unique (Cowell, 2000). 
Depending on the functional form of the Gini index used, the contribution to the whole 
inequality turns out to be the component’s share to EF λk (Goerlich, 1998; Shorrocks, 1983). 
This is why the literature does not consider Gini to be a decomposable index (see Bourguignon, 
1979; Cowell 2000; 2011; Shorrocks, 1982; 1983b).  
As a result, the contribution of a component to an overall inequality is not only about its 
inequality and its weight, but also it is about the correlations among components, the last piece 
of the source contribution jigsaw. Nonetheless, such correlations are often neglected despite 
their significance in any empirical results obtained (Duro and Teixidó, 2012). 
The correlations involve interaction effects among components; for instance, cropland footprint 
may be correlated with carbon footprint. Accordingly, the inequality contribution of, say, a 
cropland footprint would be a combination of its weighted direct effects to the overall EF-
inequality and its weighted indirect effects through any other component to the overall 
inequality. Those indirect effects must be allocated to the different contributions (see Theil, 
1979; Goerlich, 1998; Cowell, 2000, 2009; Shorrocks, 1982, 1983b, 1999). In the Gini source 
decomposition described above, the indirect effects are being assigned implicitly (by ordering 
components according to EF ranking) and arbitrarily (depending on the functional form of 
Gini
30
). In contrast, the decomposition of the variance shows clearly what the interaction effects 
are and also allows an explicit allocation of them:  
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where the contribution of source k is a combination of a weighted factor’s dispersion (first term) 
plus its weighted indirect effects (second term). Only when the EF components are uncorrelated, 
is the second term null (Shorrocks, 1982, Goerlich 1998). Consequently, the results on source 
contribution will depend on the researcher’s decision in allocating those indirect effects, i.e. on 
the decomposition rule chosen. Following this line of thought, let us consider two simple ways 
of allocating indirect effects which will also leads us to interpret inequality contributions in 
different way (Shorrocks, 1982): 
a) The pure contribution of component k is that where all the indirect effects are removed 
from its contribution. Then, the contribution of component k will be equal to the 
inequality observed when all the remaining components are evenly distributed: 
)( kk
a
k CIS µµ −+=  
                                                 
30
 See Shorrocks (1983b) 
b) All the indirect effects of component k are allocated to its contribution. Now, the 
contribution of component k will be equal to the variation observed in global inequality 
when component k is evenly distributed: )()( kk
b
k CEFIEFIS µ+−−=  
These two methods yield different results because of different allocation of a component’s 
indirect effects - this can be seen by using CV
2
 as the inequality index: 
2
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In the absence of further information, it appears that a sensible rule is to apply both approaches 
equally. Consequently, each component’s contribution will be a combination of its weighted 
direct effect to whole inequality, plus one half of its weighted indirect effects. In doing so, we 
obtain the “natural decomposition of CV
2
” proposed by Shorrocks (1982): 
2
2* ),()(
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λ ω EFCCovSSCVS kkbkakk =+=                                                    (10) 
Shorrocks (1982) proves that, under some very plausible axioms
31
, the natural decomposition of 
CV
2
, is the only unambiguous decomposition method independent of the index used to measure 
the whole inequality
32
. Thus, if the researcher asserts that the best way to analyse the inequality 
in his specific topic is, for instance, A(0.5), there is nothing to which one may object. However, 
as far as source decomposition is concerned, the researcher must use the natural decomposition 
of CV
2
 in order to avoid trivial factor contributions. This result is very opportune in 
environmental analyses, since CV
2
 benefits from the neutrality property defined above.  
Although the specialized literature has adopted this decomposition method as the most 
consistent one for the reasons explained, it is not free from criticism. The interpretation of the 
contribution of component k as its direct effect plus one half of the interaction terms for each k 
factor is not as intuitive as in most of cases (Shorrocks, 1999). One possible solution is to use 
                                                 
31
 The conditions are: a) the inequality index and the sources are continuous and symmetric. b) The 
contributions do not depend on the aggregation level. c) The contributions of the factors sum to the global 
inequality. d) The contribution of source k is zero if factor k is evenly distributed. e) With two only 
factors, where one of them is a permutation of the other, the contributions must be equal.   
32
 The variance also satisfies the Shorrocks axioms and the same result is obtained in applying the 
methods outlined above. Actually in the literature this decomposition rule is also known as the ‘natural 
decomposition of the variance’. 
the Shapley value decomposition, which has its origins in game theory
33
 (Shapley, 1953) and 
which can be understood as a generalization of the natural decomposition of the CV
2
 
(Rodriguez-Hernadez, 2004)
34
. This technique implies considering the impact on global 
inequality of eliminating the inequality in each EF component (i.e. change the real distribution 
of component k by µk to all observations). Since there is no natural order for equalizing each k 
component, Shapley decomposition averages all these impacts over all possible sequences of 
component’s k inequality elimination
35
 (Sastre and Trannoy, 2002). So, the Shapley contribution 
will be { } )()( kKSDk CSEFISEFIS µ+−−=  where SEF is a Subset of EF`s 
components ),( SEFkEFSEF ∈⊆ . It takes the form: 
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(11) 
The main advantages of using Shapley methods are that consistent and unambiguous 
decompositions can be performed using any inequality index, provided that the method is 
sensitive to the index chosen (in contrast to the Natural decomposition rule described). The 
major shortcoming, however, is that the contributions obtained are not independent from the 
level of disaggregation
36
. The resulting contribution is defined as the expected marginal 
contribution of the factor k when such an expectation is made over all possible sequences of 
factor k’s inequality elimination.  
An interesting theoretical result of the Shapley Value decomposition described is that it yields 
the same contributions as the Natural decomposition of CV
2
 as long as this index is used to 
measure inequality
37
 (Shorrocks 1999). Hence, as far as CV
2
 has been stated above as one of the 
most suitable indices to measure environmental inequalities because of its neutrality and  
                                                 
33
 The Shapley value is an allocation method which assigns the gains of a player coalition among its 
members as a function of what they contribute to the coalition, taking into account all possible orders in 
which players join the coalition 
34
 The Shapley value decomposition also takes into account all existing factors in the estimation of the 
inequality contribution, it is symmetric and consistent, but in contrast to Shorrocks (1982), the Shapley 
value decomposition is sensitive to the index used. For deeper details see (Araar, 2006; Rodriguez-
Hernadez, 2004; Sastre and Trannoy, 2002; Shorrocks, 1999) 
35
 Shapley Value Decomposition can also be performed by completely removing the source instead of 
equalizing it – this is the as Zero Shapley decomposition. However, such an approach assigns negative 
contributions to evenly distributed factors, which is against the conditions advocated by Shorrocks (1982) 
as reasonable properties of decomposition rule (see footnote 31). Moreover, Sastre and Trannoy  (2002) 
propose avoiding the Zero Shapley decomposition because it is more volatile due to its higher sensitivity  
to the aggregation level. For further details see Shorrocks (1999) and Sastre and Trannoy (2002). 
36
 Shapley Decomposition does not guarantee that the contributions assigned to the (sub)components of a 
given source sum up to the inequality contribution of that source. 
37
 If the variance is used, the Zero Shapley procedure (see footnote 35) also yields the natural 
decomposition of CV
2
. Any other index used will not yield that result (Shorrocks, 1999) 
decomposition properties, this result also allows interpreting the contributions in a marginal 
way
38
.  
Thus Figure 5 (Table A4) shows the changes in contribution of EF components during the 
period, as estimated by the natural CV
2
 decomposition. In the first place, the result (in Table A4) 
shows a clearly growing trend of Carbon footprint contribution to EF inequality, until this 
becomes the main contributor to the overall inequality. This result is consistent with White 
(2007) who constructed the natural decomposition of the Gini index for the year 2003. 
Nonetheless, the White (2007) decomposition allocates indirect effects in an arbitrary and non-
explicit way. Fortunately, the results are quite similar on this occasion
39
. 
If we consider the long term trend (which has not yet been evidenced empirically) it is worth 
noting the significant growth of the Carbon footprint’s contribution to the EF Inequality (from 
18% to 69%). In contrast, the Cropland footprint which was originally the main contributor to 
inequality has reduced its contribution drastically (from 36% to 11%). Grazing and Fishing 
footprints also follow a shrinking inequality contribution trend (from 20% to 4% in the former 
and a smaller reduction in the latter, from 7% to 3%).  
 
 
Figure 5: Relative contributions of EF components estimated by Natural decomposition of CV
2 
(1961-2007) 
                                                 
38
 Empirical calculations have been made by two methods, the Shapley rule and the Natural rule and they 
coincide. Such calculations are available on request. 
39
 Araar (2006) discusses, among other issues, the decomposition of Gini index and gives a clue as to why 
its decomposition can be close to the Shorrocks solution; this is the low-ranking effect. 
Note: The contributions can be read according to a Shorrocks (1982) or Shapley value decomposition.  
Source: Present Authors. 
It is interesting to note that the contributions of a component to the overall EF inequality differ 
from that component’s inequality indices as shown in Table 4. It has been shown that all these 
inequalities decreased in the course of the period, however, some contributions, have not 
decreased in the same proportion, the Carbon Footprint contribution has even increased 
significantly. When the Carbon footprint exhibited the highest inequality (in 1961), its 
contribution according the Shorrocks rule was 17%, whereas it had become 69% by 2007 when 
its inequality reached the lowest level in the period. The reason must be sought in the Carbon 
footprint’s share of the whole EF, which passed from representing 11% to representing 53% of 
the EF (see Table A1 in appendix). Similarly, high inequalities in the Grazing and Fishing 
footprints are compensated by representing a low share of the overall EF. The Cropland 
footprint, in contrast, exhibited low and reducing levels of inequality. However, its contribution 
to overall inequality has not reduced in the same proportion because, in spite of a reducing EF 
share (from 47% in 1961 to 21% in 2007), it still is the second largest EF share. The reason for 
this is the strong link Cropland has with the basic needs of humanity.  
These results point towards deep policy implications. In the first place, regarding international 
environment agreements, it could be claimed that policies aimed at reducing the carbon 
footprint (reduction in energy use) of countries will lead, not only to a more sustainable scale, 
but also to a more just distribution of EF (White 2007), this may lead on to further international 
consensus. However, converting cropland to bio-fuel land in order to reduce CO2 emissions will 
lead unavoidably to an increase in the Cropland footprint share and in its inequality, which may 
in turn have serious implications, not only for international agreements, but also for society in 
general, because of its link to basic human needs.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Empirical analyses on ecological asymmetries across countries have become an essential tool 
for policy makers in order to achieve a just sustainability. This paper has focussed on the 
analysis of international inequality in natural capital consumption, as measured by the 
Ecological Footprint framework. Our aim in doing so has been twofold: On the one hand, we 
revise the methodologies on inequality measurement when they are applied to environmental 
issues rather than to income. Inequality measurement on environmental issues has been 
commonly performed by directly borrowing techniques from the income distribution literature. 
These are Gini indices, Atkinson’s family indices, Theil measures, etc. Nonetheless, income is a 
‘good’ while environmental impact is not (it is a ‘bad’). As a result, this paper highlights some 
underlying properties in the traditional inequality measurement methods which might not fit in 
environmental inequality analyses. On the other hand, we extend the empirical evidence relating 
to the international distribution of Ecological Footprint (EF) by using a longer EF time series 
than in previous attempts. We have used a database from 1961 to 2007 for a representative 
sample of countries whereas the existent evidence was limited to a one year cross section 
(White 2007), or to five years cross sections covering from 1996 to 2005 (Chen and Ma, 2010). 
The result is the application and discussion of a wide range of inequality methods to a greater 
EF database.  
As far as methodology is concerned, this paper shows that Lorenz dominance analyses are 
useful in particular parts of the distribution and that they should be accompanied with GLC 
dominance, otherwise the Lorenz curves could lead to uncertain statements. For instance, it has 
been shown that in 1961, the low EF countries enjoyed greater equality than those in 2007, 
nonetheless, the latter had less EF per capita. So in terms of sustainability, as far as low-EF 
countries are concerned, it is unclear whether one should prefer the distribution of 1961 to that 
of 2007. By considering toxic waste exposure instead of EF, we may clarify the underlying idea 
here. Yet, neither Lorenz curves nor GLC allows a complete ranking of distributions because of 
curve intersections. Inequality indices are then indispensable for doing this in an unambiguous 
way.  
We have critically reviewed some of the properties of inequality indices, taking into account an 
ecological economics framework. Although there exist different types of inequality indices, and 
several of them are widely used in ecological inequality measurement (such the Gini 
coefficient), we have demonstrated that some typical properties of those indices does not fit well 
when environmental issues, rather than income, are being analysed. For instance, Atkinson’s 
and Theil’s indices weights the low parts of the distribution more heavily because of their 
Diminishing Transfers Principle property. Gini coefficient instead weights the distribution mode 
more heavily. Neither of these behaviours is justified in environmental inequalities. In this 
sense, the neutrality character (all parts of distribution being treated equally) of GE(2) or CV
2
 
has been discussed as a desirable property to being satisfied (jointly with those basic properties). 
As a result, neutral indices show a quite stable inequality trend in the course of the period in 
spite of a significant increase in the first decade and a significant reduction in the last years of 
the period. 
Finally, we have dealt with inequality additive decomposition methodologies; by subgroup and 
by sources (EF components). The inequality subgroup decomposition has been performed using 
exogenous country groups (World Bank classification). GE(0) exhibits the best properties for 
this kind of decomposition, however it is a non-neutral index (it weights the bottom of the 
distribution more heavily). Hence, there is a trade-off between GE(2) neutrality properties and 
GE(0) decomposition properties. Such a trade-off must be considered when the results are being 
interpreted. Nonetheless, in the EF application there are no significant differences between the 
decompositions of both indices, which contributes to making the result obtained more robust: 
subgroup decomposition by World Bank group of countries indicates that between group 
inequality explains almost the totality of international EF-inequality (83-87%). This result leads 
to two important conclusions: firstly, there is a heavy international division in natural resource 
consumption patterns defined by World Bank classification groups, indicating highly 
homogenous consumption patterns within those groups. This result is in line with 
Environmental Justice theory which points that certain subgroups historically have borne a 
disproportionate share of environmental burdens. In our case, this disproportion is in terms of 
natural capital consumption. Secondly, since the within inequality in per capita EF is so 
relatively low, reaching international environmental agreements (as far as they were based on 
EF) may be more fruitful for global environment protection if these were to be held on a 
regional basis (such as those defined by World Bank) instead of World agreements. 
Regarding source decomposition, we have noted the inappropriateness of the widely used Gini 
coefficient decomposition since its resulting contributions are non-unique and the interaction 
effects are allocated in an implicit and arbitrary way. The only non-ambiguous way of 
decomposing inequality by sources is the natural decomposition of CV
2
, which allows, besides, 
interpreting contributions in marginal terms. The empirical results point out that, although all 
EF component inequality has reduced, the contribution to total EF inequality has not necessarily 
followed the same movement. This is due to changes in components proportions in total EF. For 
instance, Carbon Footprint’s inequality has reduced; nevertheless, its contribution to inequality 
has increased because of its increasing share of the total EF. In contrast, Grazing and Fishing 
footprints (related to the diets of industrialized countries) exhibit relatively high levels of 
international inequality, however, they contribute modestly to overall EF inequality because of 
its low share of the total EF. The Cropland Footprint contribution to EF inequality has reduced 
significantly as a result of both having historically low inequality (basic subsistence highly 
depends on cropland consumption) and having decreased its EF share in the course of the 
period. This analysis provide important clues for international environmental policies: reducing 
per capita carbon footprint of countries will lead, not only to a more sustainable scale, but also 
to a fairer distribution of EF, enabling greater possibilities for international environmental 
agreements. Nevertheless, if that goal is implemented by converting typical cropland utilities in 
commercial energy (bio-fuels), this policy will necessarily impact on Cropland Footprint 
equality and probably its share of total EF will also increase. As a result, the subsistence 
function of cropland will be seriously threatened. 
Environmental inequality measurement has been widely analysed in recent years because of its 
important implications in terms of universal ethics and environmental policy. Such literature, 
however, has focussed mainly on narrower environmental indicators such as CO2 emissions and 
hardly at all on more multifaceted indicators such EF. Additionally, the methods applied to 
measure inequality are not always correctly adjusted to suit an ecological economics 
framework. Therefore, the results and discussions presented here may be of interest to 
researchers and policy makers concerned with a Fair Sustainability framework. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. World Ecological Footprint per capita  
Year Cropland Grazing land Forest Fishing ground Carbon F. Built land  EF 
1961 1.13 (48.16%) 0.39 (16.54%) 0.40 (17.04%) 0.09 (3.89%) 0.27 (11.63%) 0.06 (2.75%) 2.36 
1962 1.12 (47.00%) 0.39 (16.38%) 0.40 (16.70%) 0.09 (3.92%) 0.32 (13.28%) 0.06 (2.72%) 2.38 
1963 1.10 (45.41%) 0.39 (16.00%) 0.39 (16.17%) 0.09 (3.87%) 0.39 (15.88%) 0.06 (2.67%) 2.43 
1964 1.08 (43.79%) 0.38 (15.53%) 0.40 (16.13%) 0.09 (3.72%) 0.45 (18.22%) 0.06 (2.62%) 2.48 
1965 1.07 (42.26%) 0.39 (15.34%) 0.40 (15.71%) 0.10 (3.79%) 0.51 (20.32%) 0.06 (2.57%) 2.52 
1966 1.05 (41.09%) 0.37 (14.51%) 0.40 (15.52%) 0.10 (3.89%) 0.57 (22.44%) 0.06 (2.55%) 2.55 
1967 1.03 (40.36%) 0.37 (14.41%) 0.39 (15.38%) 0.10 (3.97%) 0.60 (23.34%) 0.06 (2.55%) 2.55 
1968 1.02 (39.13%) 0.36 (14.01%) 0.39 (14.91%) 0.10 (4.01%) 0.66 (25.44%) 0.07 (2.50%) 2.60 
1969 1.01 (37.96%) 0.35 (13.26%) 0.38 (14.46%) 0.10 (3.80%) 0.75 (28.08%) 0.07 (2.45%) 2.66 
1970 0.99 (35.99%) 0.35 (12.61%) 0.38 (13.95%) 0.10 (3.65%) 0.87 (31.43%) 0.07 (2.36%) 2.76 
1971 0.97 (35.07%) 0.34 (12.29%) 0.38 (13.75%) 0.10 (3.60%) 0.91 (32.95%) 0.07 (2.35%) 2.78 
1972 0.96 (34.04%) 0.34 (12.16%) 0.37 (13.31%) 0.10 (3.60%) 0.97 (34.56%) 0.07 (2.32%) 2.81 
1973 0.94 (32.92%) 0.33 (11.44%) 0.38 (13.28%) 0.10 (3.56%) 1.04 (36.51%) 0.07 (2.28%) 2.86 
1974 0.93 (32.84%) 0.34 (12.07%) 0.37 (13.17%) 0.10 (3.62%) 1.02 (35.99%) 0.07 (2.31%) 2.82 
1975 0.91 (32.91%) 0.34 (12.26%) 0.36 (12.86%) 0.10 (3.47%) 1.00 (36.14%) 0.07 (2.36%) 2.77 
1976 0.90 (31.89%) 0.33 (11.59%) 0.36 (12.94%) 0.10 (3.47%) 1.06 (37.78%) 0.07 (2.32%) 2.81 
1977 0.88 (31.38%) 0.31 (11.10%) 0.36 (12.73%) 0.10 (3.39%) 1.10 (39.08%) 0.07 (2.32%) 2.81 
1978 0.87 (30.89%) 0.30 (10.67%) 0.36 (12.76%) 0.10 (3.41%) 1.13 (39.95%) 0.07 (2.32%) 2.82 
1979 0.86 (30.24%) 0.30 (10.60%) 0.36 (12.80%) 0.09 (3.32%) 1.16 (40.74%) 0.07 (2.30%) 2.84 
1980 0.85 (30.41%) 0.30 (10.75%) 0.36 (12.86%) 0.09 (3.35%) 1.12 (40.27%) 0.07 (2.36%) 2.78 
1981 0.83 (30.64%) 0.29 (10.81%) 0.35 (12.83%) 0.10 (3.53%) 1.08 (39.78%) 0.07 (2.41%) 2.72 
1982 0.82 (31.04%) 0.29 (10.76%) 0.34 (12.76%) 0.10 (3.63%) 1.04 (39.34%) 0.07 (2.48%) 2.65 
1983 0.81 (30.73%) 0.29 (11.04%) 0.35 (13.08%) 0.09 (3.56%) 1.03 (39.11%) 0.07 (2.47%) 2.64 
1984 0.80 (30.23%) 0.27 (10.32%) 0.35 (13.28%) 0.09 (3.58%) 1.06 (40.12%) 0.07 (2.46%) 2.65 
1985 0.79 (30.51%) 0.23 (8.83%) 0.35 (13.34%) 0.09 (3.65%) 1.07 (41.16%) 0.07 (2.50%) 2.60 
1986 0.78 (30.08%) 0.23 (8.75%) 0.35 (13.40%) 0.10 (3.72%) 1.08 (41.55%) 0.07 (2.50%) 2.61 
1987 0.77 (29.24%) 0.23 (8.70%) 0.35 (13.36%) 0.10 (3.82%) 1.12 (42.43%) 0.07 (2.46%) 2.64 
1988 0.76 (28.39%) 0.24 (8.97%) 0.35 (13.07%) 0.10 (3.84%) 1.16 (43.30%) 0.07 (2.43%) 2.68 
1989 0.75 (27.87%) 0.24 (8.97%) 0.35 (12.99%) 0.11 (3.96%) 1.18 (43.79%) 0.07 (2.42%) 2.69 
1990 0.74 (27.82%) 0.24 (9.06%) 0.34 (12.88%) 0.10 (3.79%) 1.17 (43.99%) 0.07 (2.45%) 2.65 
1991 0.73 (27.75%) 0.24 (9.34%) 0.32 (12.28%) 0.10 (3.75%) 1.16 (44.39%) 0.07 (2.49%) 2.61 
1992 0.70 (27.02%) 0.24 (9.24%) 0.31 (12.03%) 0.11 (4.10%) 1.18 (45.15%) 0.06 (2.46%) 2.60 
1993 0.69 (26.82%) 0.24 (9.24%) 0.31 (11.82%) 0.11 (4.12%) 1.18 (45.52%) 0.06 (2.48%) 2.59 
1994 0.68 (26.57%) 0.24 (9.28%) 0.30 (11.73%) 0.11 (4.32%) 1.17 (45.61%) 0.06 (2.49%) 2.57 
1995 0.67 (25.93%) 0.24 (9.41%) 0.30 (11.68%) 0.11 (4.41%) 1.20 (46.10%) 0.06 (2.47%) 2.60 
1996 0.66 (25.46%) 0.23 (9.04%) 0.30 (11.45%) 0.12 (4.45%) 1.22 (47.12%) 0.06 (2.47%) 2.60 
1997 0.65 (25.41%) 0.23 (8.83%) 0.30 (11.65%) 0.11 (4.47%) 1.21 (47.14%) 0.06 (2.50%) 2.57 
1998 0.65 (25.50%) 0.23 (8.88%) 0.29 (11.36%) 0.11 (4.48%) 1.20 (47.24%) 0.06 (2.53%) 2.54 
1999 0.64 (25.32%) 0.22 (8.87%) 0.29 (11.65%) 0.11 (4.51%) 1.19 (47.11%) 0.06 (2.54%) 2.53 
2000 0.63 (24.97%) 0.22 (8.88%) 0.30 (11.76%) 0.11 (4.34%) 1.20 (47.51%) 0.06 (2.54%) 2.53 
2001 0.63 (24.95%) 0.22 (8.86%) 0.28 (11.30%) 0.11 (4.39%) 1.20 (47.95%) 0.06 (2.56%) 2.51 
2002 0.62 (24.46%) 0.23 (8.97%) 0.28 (11.24%) 0.11 (4.31%) 1.22 (48.46%) 0.06 (2.55%) 2.52 
2003 0.61 (23.83%) 0.22 (8.77%) 0.28 (11.08%) 0.11 (4.25%) 1.27 (49.56%) 0.06 (2.50%) 2.56 
2004 0.61 (23.16%) 0.21 (8.18%) 0.29 (10.96%) 0.11 (4.22%) 1.33 (51.03%) 0.06 (2.45%) 2.62 
2005 0.60 (22.62%) 0.22 (8.12%) 0.29 (10.97%) 0.11 (4.18%) 1.37 (51.69%) 0.06 (2.41%) 2.66 
2006 0.59 (22.17%) 0.22 (8.07%) 0.28 (10.61%) 0.11 (4.12%) 1.41 (52.63%) 0.06 (2.39%) 2.68 
2007 0.59 (21.69%) 0.21 (7.75%) 0.29 (10.61%) 0.11 (4.03%) 1.44 (53.54%) 0.06 (2.37%) 2.70 
Source: Present Authors 
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Table A2. Inequality indices of EF per capita. 
year GINI Efpc T(0) T(1) T(2) CV² A(0.5) A(1) 
1961 0.331863 0.179226 0.189064 0.221799 0.443598 0.088832 0.164083 
1962 0.340601 0.18826 0.198431 0.233125 0.46625 0.093128 0.171601 
1963 0.348073 0.195861 0.207045 0.245799 0.491598 0.096857 0.177873 
1964 0.346067 0.193413 0.204768 0.242528 0.485056 0.095781 0.175858 
1965 0.357436 0.205764 0.217594 0.258574 0.517148 0.101607 0.185975 
1966 0.365708 0.215069 0.227701 0.274284 0.548568 0.105995 0.193514 
1967 0.368823 0.220491 0.233514 0.279064 0.558128 0.108694 0.197875 
1968 0.382148 0.236772 0.254051 0.312909 0.625818 0.117006 0.210828 
1969 0.391247 0.249119 0.266751 0.329111 0.658222 0.122718 0.220513 
1970 0.389138 0.247006 0.262932 0.319889 0.639778 0.121455 0.218864 
1971 0.403557 0.265816 0.283596 0.350375 0.70075 0.130326 0.23342 
1972 0.40974 0.275489 0.292825 0.361321 0.722642 0.134602 0.240799 
1973 0.415801 0.284671 0.304146 0.379181 0.758362 0.139184 0.247738 
1974 0.408946 0.27418 0.289289 0.354787 0.709574 0.133488 0.239805 
1975 0.398244 0.258086 0.277122 0.344603 0.689206 0.127065 0.227471 
1976 0.411443 0.277105 0.29676 0.371164 0.742328 0.135767 0.242025 
1977 0.413506 0.279962 0.30151 0.380464 0.760928 0.137442 0.244187 
1978 0.413749 0.279761 0.300625 0.37962 0.75924 0.137135 0.244035 
1979 0.418671 0.28729 0.307383 0.388589 0.777178 0.140282 0.249706 
1980 0.404805 0.268524 0.28246 0.344797 0.689594 0.130622 0.235493 
1981 0.402587 0.262972 0.280508 0.349538 0.699076 0.128809 0.231237 
1982 0.401942 0.262577 0.280454 0.352258 0.704516 0.128627 0.230933 
1983 0.381493 0.23479 0.250775 0.30778 0.61556 0.115723 0.209263 
1984 0.398198 0.256443 0.275983 0.347329 0.694658 0.12624 0.226201 
1985 0.403467 0.26323 0.285199 0.363881 0.727762 0.129786 0.231435 
1986 0.399454 0.258645 0.279678 0.354078 0.708156 0.127559 0.227903 
1987 0.401498 0.261941 0.280809 0.352391 0.704782 0.128578 0.230443 
1988 0.391679 0.24834 0.266193 0.330683 0.661366 0.122253 0.219905 
1989 0.39766 0.257045 0.278703 0.353083 0.706166 0.126997 0.226666 
1990 0.397332 0.256368 0.276652 0.349914 0.699828 0.126318 0.226143 
1991 0.386913 0.242348 0.258756 0.321538 0.643076 0.11912 0.215217 
1992 0.392158 0.248985 0.271967 0.350584 0.701168 0.123491 0.220409 
1993 0.376785 0.229976 0.244149 0.302631 0.605262 0.112856 0.205447 
1994 0.38846 0.244235 0.262502 0.332241 0.664482 0.120241 0.216696 
1995 0.382126 0.23678 0.250645 0.309904 0.619808 0.115911 0.210835 
1996 0.382961 0.238944 0.250801 0.310256 0.620512 0.11633 0.212541 
1997 0.388101 0.243835 0.260967 0.329826 0.659652 0.119759 0.216383 
1998 0.389878 0.245512 0.267234 0.344002 0.688004 0.12154 0.217696 
1999 0.389766 0.245884 0.267659 0.343098 0.686196 0.121786 0.217987 
2000 0.391711 0.248794 0.268371 0.342659 0.685318 0.122543 0.22026 
2001 0.391375 0.249028 0.266981 0.338792 0.677584 0.12228 0.220442 
2002 0.39272 0.251387 0.267341 0.336766 0.673532 0.122897 0.222279 
2003 0.390124 0.247222 0.263856 0.334474 0.668948 0.121108 0.219033 
2004 0.394409 0.253854 0.26877 0.339853 0.679706 0.123678 0.224195 
2005 0.389538 0.248936 0.262337 0.330875 0.66175 0.121054 0.22037 
2006 0.381548 0.239448 0.247386 0.303389 0.606778 0.115576 0.212938 
2007 0.377429 0.233587 0.240921 0.292457 0.584914 0.112849 0.208311 
Source: Present Authors 
 
Table A3. Decomposing International EF inequality changes by population share changes and by per capita EF changes by subperiods of 5 years 
 CV2 GE(2) GINI GE(0) GE(1) A(1) A(0.5) 
Ineq. Index 1961 0.4436   0.2218   0.3319   0.1792   0.1890   0.1641   0.0888   
Total change 1961-1965 0.0735   0.0367  0.0256   0.0266  0.0284   0.0219  0.0128   
Growth rate 17%   17%  8%   15%  15%   13%  14%   
EF share 0.0717 98% 0.0359 98% 0.0268 105% 0.0283 106% 0.0291 102% 0.0233 106% 0.0133 104% 
Pop share 0.0018 2% 0.0009 2% -0.0012 -5% -0.0016 -6% -0.0007 -2% -0.0013 -6% -0.0005 -4% 
Ineq. Index 1965 0.5171   0.2585   0.3575   0.2058   0.2175   0.1860   0.1017   
Total change 1965-1970 0.1227   0.0614  0.0316   0.0412  0.0454   0.0328  0.0198   
Growth rate 24%   24%  9%   20%  21%   18%  19%   
EF share 0.1166 95% 0.0583 95% 0.0344 109% 0.0454 110% 0.0466 102% 0.0362 110% 0.0210 106% 
Pop share 0.0061 5% 0.0031 5% -0.0028 -9% -0.0043 -10% -0.0011 -2% -0.0033 -10% -0.0013 -6% 
Ineq. Index 1970 0.6398   0.3199   0.3891   0.2470   0.2629   0.2189   0.1215   
Total change 1970-1975 0.0493   0.0247  0.0092   0.0112  0.0141   0.0087  0.0057   
Growth rate 8%   8%  2%   5%  5%   4%  5%   
EF share 0.0438 89% 0.0219 89% 0.0121 132% 0.0159 142% 0.0158 112% 0.0123 142% 0.0071 125% 
Pop share 0.0055 11% 0.0027 11% -0.0030 -32% -0.0047 -42% -0.0017 -12% -0.0036 -42% -0.0014 -25% 
Ineq. Index 1975 0.6891   0.3445   0.3983   0.2582   0.2770   0.2275   0.1271   
Total change 1975-1980 0.0006   0.0003  0.0065   0.0103  0.0055   0.0079  0.0035   
Growth rate 0%   0%  2%   4%  2%   3%  3%   
EF share -0.0057 -1035% -0.0029 -1035% 0.0085 129% 0.0141 137% 0.0064 116% 0.0108 137% 0.0046 133% 
Pop share 0.0063 1135% 0.0031 1135% -0.0019 -29% -0.0038 -37% -0.0009 -16% -0.0029 -37% -0.0011 -33% 
Ineq. Index 1980 0.6896   0.3448   0.4048   0.2685   0.2825   0.2355   0.1306   
Total change 1980-1985 0.0381   0.0191  -0.0014   -0.0053  0.0027   -0.0040  -0.0008   
Growth rate 6%   6%  0%   -2%  1%   -2%  -1%   
EF share 0.0324 85% 0.0162 85% 0.0010 -73% -0.0015 29% 0.0038 142% -0.0012 29% 0.0004 -44% 
Pop share 0.0057 15% 0.0029 15% -0.0023 173% -0.0038 71% -0.0011 -42% -0.0029 71% -0.0012 144% 
Ineq. Index 1985 0.7278   0.3639   0.4034   0.2632   0.2852   0.2314   0.1298   
Total change 1985-1990 -0.0279   -0.0140  -0.0061   -0.0069  -0.0085   -0.0053  -0.0035   
Growth rate -4%   -4%  -2%   -3%  -3%   -2%  -3%   
EF share -0.0362 130% -0.0181 130% -0.0044 73% -0.0042 61% -0.0085 100% -0.0032 61% -0.0028 80% 
Pop share 0.0083 -30% 0.0042 -30% -0.0017 27% -0.0027 39% 0.0000 0% -0.0021 39% -0.0007 20% 
Ineq. Index 1990 0.6999   0.3499   0.3973   0.2563   0.2767   0.2261   0.1263   
Total change 1990-1995 -0.0801   -0.0401  -0.0152   -0.0195  -0.0261   -0.0152  -0.0103   
Growth rate -11%   -11%  -4%   -8%  -9%   -7%  -8%   
EF share -0.0881 110% -0.0440 110% -0.0151 99% -0.0190 98% -0.0271 104% -0.0149 98% -0.0105 102% 
Pop share 0.0079 -10% 0.0040 -10% -0.0001 1% -0.0005 2% 0.0010 -4% -0.0004 2% 0.0002 -2% 
Ineq. Index 1995 0.6197   0.3099   0.3821   0.2368   0.2506   0.2109   0.1160   
Total change 1995-2000 0.0656   0.0328  0.0096   0.0119  0.0178   0.0094  0.0066   
Growth rate 11%   11%  3%   5%  7%   4%  6%   
EF share 0.0563 86% 0.0282 86% 0.0093 97% 0.0119 100% 0.0162 91% 0.0093 100% 0.0062 95% 
Pop share 0.0093 14% 0.0046 14% 0.0003 3% 0.0000 0% 0.0016 9% 0.0000 0% 0.0003 5% 
Ineq. Index 2000 0.6853   0.3427   0.3917   0.2488   0.2684   0.2202   0.1225   
Total change 2000-2005 -0.0236   -0.0118  -0.0022   0.0001  -0.0060   0.0001  -0.0015   
Growth rate -3%   -3%  -1%   0%  -2%   0%  -1%   
EF share -0.0328 139% -0.0164 139% -0.0032 148% -0.0007 
-
490% -0.0082 135% -0.0006 -490% -0.0021 144% 
Pop share 0.0093 -39% 0.0046 -39% 0.0011 -48% 0.0009 590% 0.0021 -35% 0.0007 590% 0.0007 -44% 
Ineq. Index 2005 0.6618   0.3309   0.3895   0.2489   0.2623   0.2204   0.1210   
Total change 2005-2007 -0.0768   -0.0384  -0.0121   -0.0154  -0.0214   -0.0121  -0.0082   
Growth rate -12%   -12%  -3%   -6%  -8%   -5%  -7%   
EF share -0.0809 105% -0.0404 105% -0.0127 105% -0.0158 103% -0.0224 105% -0.0124 103% -0.0085 104% 
Pop share 0.0041 -5% 0.0020 -5% 0.0006 -5% 0.0004 -3% 0.0011 -5% 0.0004 -3% 0.0003 -4% 
Ineq. Index 2007 0.5850   0.2925   0.3775   0.2335   0.2410   0.2083   0.1128   
Source: Present Authors 
 
 
 
Table A4. Natural decomposition of the Ecological Footprint per capita 
Year Fishing Cropland Grazing  Forest  Carbon Built  Total 
1961 0.0654 0.3593 0.2007 0.1853 0.1751 0.0146 1 
1962 0.0646 0.3513 0.1890 0.1871 0.1934 0.0150 1 
1963 0.0610 0.3494 0.1733 0.1717 0.2308 0.0124 1 
1964 0.0591 0.2949 0.1739 0.1790 0.2807 0.0137 1 
1965 0.0576 0.2946 0.1501 0.1751 0.3114 0.0116 1 
1966 0.0558 0.2737 0.1468 0.1703 0.3425 0.0102 1 
1967 0.0576 0.2744 0.1333 0.1613 0.3620 0.0118 1 
1968 0.0526 0.2759 0.1243 0.1532 0.3856 0.0091 1 
1969 0.0469 0.2665 0.1086 0.1490 0.4209 0.0085 1 
1970 0.0481 0.2146 0.0980 0.1418 0.4892 0.0084 1 
1971 0.0418 0.2325 0.0899 0.1382 0.4881 0.0090 1 
1972 0.0416 0.2165 0.0872 0.1269 0.5176 0.0099 1 
1973 0.0393 0.1922 0.0860 0.1316 0.5424 0.0083 1 
1974 0.0413 0.1916 0.0999 0.1302 0.5310 0.0080 1 
1975 0.0383 0.2103 0.1091 0.1179 0.5184 0.0083 1 
1976 0.0395 0.1937 0.0929 0.1235 0.5437 0.0061 1 
1977 0.0350 0.1936 0.0802 0.1221 0.5614 0.0086 1 
1978 0.0354 0.1792 0.0796 0.1313 0.5663 0.0078 1 
1979 0.0350 0.1874 0.0736 0.1312 0.5655 0.0076 1 
1980 0.0390 0.1709 0.0779 0.1328 0.5710 0.0099 1 
1981 0.0351 0.1926 0.0804 0.1302 0.5529 0.0100 1 
1982 0.0380 0.2385 0.0799 0.1169 0.5150 0.0115 1 
1983 0.0404 0.1624 0.0854 0.1407 0.5602 0.0085 1 
1984 0.0363 0.1831 0.0738 0.1433 0.5517 0.0105 1 
1985 0.0393 0.2015 0.0525 0.1429 0.5523 0.0096 1 
1986 0.0393 0.1899 0.0475 0.1526 0.5620 0.0096 1 
1987 0.0439 0.1673 0.0478 0.1539 0.5789 0.0098 1 
1988 0.0428 0.1368 0.0603 0.1488 0.6038 0.0084 1 
1989 0.0440 0.1446 0.0500 0.1517 0.6011 0.0084 1 
1990 0.0403 0.1584 0.0454 0.1481 0.5998 0.0080 1 
1991 0.0410 0.1571 0.0513 0.1287 0.6108 0.0089 1 
1992 0.0399 0.1546 0.0478 0.1297 0.6197 0.0084 1 
1993 0.0401 0.1355 0.0534 0.1392 0.6230 0.0077 1 
1994 0.0422 0.1540 0.0427 0.1377 0.6139 0.0083 1 
1995 0.0441 0.1296 0.0520 0.1385 0.6267 0.0081 1 
1996 0.0382 0.1332 0.0462 0.1307 0.6432 0.0087 1 
1997 0.0388 0.1273 0.0400 0.1337 0.6530 0.0078 1 
1998 0.0334 0.1311 0.0398 0.1347 0.6529 0.0084 1 
1999 0.0350 0.1276 0.0379 0.1354 0.6570 0.0085 1 
2000 0.0326 0.1241 0.0373 0.1364 0.6610 0.0085 1 
2001 0.0352 0.1204 0.0375 0.1284 0.6698 0.0077 1 
2002 0.0339 0.1154 0.0398 0.1305 0.6735 0.0086 1 
2003 0.0308 0.1262 0.0424 0.1269 0.6652 0.0069 1 
2004 0.0291 0.1305 0.0345 0.1284 0.6691 0.0082 1 
2005 0.0276 0.1233 0.0352 0.1332 0.6725 0.0069 1 
2006 0.0294 0.1074 0.0353 0.1227 0.6986 0.0071 1 
2007 0.0292 0.1163 0.0370 0.1172 0.6923 0.0073 1 
Source: Present Authors 
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